










Hourly Wage Rate and Taxable Labor Income 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2644 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Hourly Wage Rate and Taxable Labor Income 





Recently, a voluminous literature estimating the taxable income elasticity has emerged as an 
important field in empirical public economics. However, to a large extent it is still unknown 
how the hourly wage rate, an important component of taxable income, reacts to changes in 
marginal tax rates. In this study we use a rich panel data set and a sequence of tax reforms that 
took place in Sweden during the 1980’s to estimate the elasticity of the hourly wage rate with 
respect to the net-of-tax rate. While carefully accounting for the endogeneity of marginal tax 
rates as well as other factors that determine wage rates we do find a statistically significant 
response both among married men and married women. The hourly wage rate elasticity with 
respect to the net-of-tax rate is estimated to 0.14-0.16 for males and 0.41-0.57 for females. In 
addition, we obtain uncompensated taxable labor income elasticities of around 0.21 for men 
and 0.96-1.44 for women. In contrast to earlier studies, we also find significant income effects 
for males. Accordingly, for males the compensated taxable labor income elasticity is about 4 
percentage points higher than the uncompensated one. 
JEL Code: H24, J22, J31. 
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1. Introduction 
Historically, the study of the behavioural response to changes in marginal tax rates has been 
centred on the labor supply choice. However, the standard labor supply model, where the 
individual chooses hours of work given an exogenous wage rate, abstracts from the possibility 
that the individual is able to affect her own wage rate. Indeed, it is not far-fetched to consider 
situations when a lower tax rate may induce the individual to change job, take on more 
difficult and compensated tasks, put in more effort into wage bargaining, alter form of 
compensation or simply work more intensely. Even though such changes in work effort and 
tax avoidance to a large extent are unobservable to the econometrician, behavioural changes 
along this margin are nevertheless likely to show up in altered hourly wage rates.  
Reasoning along these lines has been one of the rationales of a growing body of 
research measuring the elasticity of taxable income with respect to the net-of-tax rate (one 
minus the marginal tax rate) with Lindsey (1987) and Feldstein (1995) as seminal 
contributions. However, it is still unknown if, or to what extent, individuals adjust their hourly 
wage rates in response to tax changes. Recent research on U.S. data (Gruber and Saez 2002, 
Kopczuk 2005 and Giertz 2007) indicates that much of the taxable income response lies in 
deduction behavior.
1  
Here we address the issue of hourly wage rate responsiveness by employing a rich 
survey and register data set created from the 1981 and 1991 waves of the Swedish Level of 
Living Survey.
2 In particular, we have access to a survey variable on the individual’s hourly 
wage rate on a longitudinal basis. Between 1981 and 1991 top marginal tax rates were cut by 
34 percentage points in Sweden in a piecemeal fashion. This sequence of tax reforms created 
substantial individual exogenous variation in marginal tax changes depending on tax bracket 
in 1981. In this paper we exploit this exogenous variation, together with the rich panel data 
material, to test whether hourly wage rates are sensitive or not to changes in marginal tax 
rates.  
While carefully accounting for the endogeneity of marginal tax rates as well as other 
factors that determine wage rates we do find a statistically significant response both among 
married men and women: The estimates of the hourly wage rate elasticity with respect to the 
net-of-tax rate range from 0.14 to 0.16 for married males and from 0.41 to 0.57 for married 
                                                 
1 See Giertz (2004) for a survey of the recent U.S. literature.   
2 See, for example, Fritzell and Lundberg (1994) for a description of this data source.    3
females. Seen from the perspective that wage rates traditionally have been assumed to be 
exogenous in labor supply models these estimates must be thought of as surprisingly large. 
In line with previous literature, we have also estimated the elasticity of taxable labor 
income with respect to the net-of-tax rate. For married men we obtain (uncompensated) 
taxable labor income elasticities of around 0.21. For women the corresponding estimates 
range from 0.96 to 1.44. Taxable labor income is defined as the earnings net of costs of 
earning the income.  
We improve upon existing studies in one additional crucial respect: we specify virtual 
incomes and set out to estimate non-labor income elasticities. For males we find a statistically 
significant non-labor income elasticity with expected sign: -0.07. The corresponding estimates 
for females are not significantly different from zero. Armed with these elasticities we are able 
to compute compensated  elasticities. For males, an uncompensated elasticity of 0.21 
corresponds to a compensated taxable labor income elasticity of 0.25. Interestingly, our 
finding of significant income effects conflicts with a frequently cited result in Gruber and 
Saez (2002). Using a different methodology, they did not find significant income effects on 
U.S. data from the 1980’s. 
Our paper also adds to a growing literature that examines tax responsiveness on 
Swedish data. From different methodological perspectives Gelber (2008), Hansson (2007), 
Holmlund and Söderström (2007), Ljunge and Ragan (2006) and Selén (2005) all exploit 
large register data sets and study how mostly earned income reacts to changes in net-of-tax 
rates. However, none of these papers utilizes the Swedish Level of Living Survey and none of 
these make a separate analysis for hourly wage rates.    
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we briefly describe the income 
tax changes that occurred between 1981 and 1991 in Sweden; a more thorough description is 
given in appendix A. In section 3 we discuss a number of methodological issues. These 
involve our treatment of income effects, our model framework and instrumentation procedure.  
Section 4 contains a description of the data source. The estimation results are presented and 
analyzed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Swedish income tax reforms 1981-1991 
In 1981 top marginal taxes were near a historical high; taxpayers in the highest bracket were 
subject to a marginal tax rate of 85 percent. As can be seen from Figure 1, which depicts the 
evolution of top marginal tax rates during the relevant time period, there was a steady decline 
in top marginal tax rates between 1981 and 1991. The most dramatic cut occurred in   4
conjunction with the profound tax reform of 1991, sometimes called ‘the tax reform of the 
century’ (Agell et. al. 1998), when top marginal taxes fell by 15 percentage points.
 3   
However, if one considers the whole period 1981-1991 marginal taxes were reduced by 34 
percentage points for those who were in the top bracket in 1981.  
 
 
Figure 1. Top marginal tax rates 1981-1991 in percent by year.  
 
Figure 2 illustrates average marginal tax rates for 1981 and 1991 by income decile in our 
estimation sample, where income deciles have been defined based on taxable labor income as 
of 1986. Marginal tax rates has been computed while taking both the statutory income tax 
schedule and means-dependent housing allowances into account. Apparently, income tax 
progressivity has been considerably reduced between the two years. The largest decrease in 
marginal tax rates was in the 10
th decile, whereas the tax changes were noticeably more 
modest in the two bottom deciles. Indeed, there were also considerable reductions in marginal 
tax rates in the middle of the income distribution. The main reason is that the 1981 statutory 
tax schedule was very progressive even at moderate income levels.  
 
                                                 
3 The timing of the 1991 Swedish tax reform coincided with the most severe macroeconomic downturn since the 
1930’s, and the recession has rendered appraisals of the reform more difficult. In June 1990, the unemployment 
rate was 1.1 percent, while it in the same month of 1993 was 9.0 percent (SCB 2005). Our interpretation is that 
the soaring unemployment rates pose a minor problem to our study that uses data from 1981 and 1991. First, on 
an annual basis the unemployment rate was 3.0 percent in 1991, which can be compared with 2.5 for 1981. 
Second, the biggest increase in unemployment was among younger individuals. Since our sample contains 
individuals aged 22-54 in 1981 and 32-64 in 1991 our sample was affected to a less extent by the 
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Figure 2. Average marginal tax rates in 1981and 1991 by deciles based on taxable labor income in 1986. 
 
3.  Methodological considerations 
3.1 Taxable income model 
In what follows, we briefly describe the canonical taxable income model as presented in 
Gruber and Saez (2002) to get a framework for interpreting the taxable income elasticities. 
The wage rate responses cannot be interpreted within that model. Therefore, in section 3.2 we 
also discuss a model where the individual can vary both work effort and hours worked. 
Following Gruber and Saez (2002) we depart from a model of utility maximization 
where the individual chooses her optimal amounts of consumption, C, and taxable income z, 
subject to the budget constraint  R z C    ) 1 (  , where   is the marginal tax rate on a linear 
segment of the income tax schedule and R  is virtual income. In a Swedish institutional 
context it is natural to interpret z as taxable labor income.
4 Optimization yields optimal 
taxable income supply functions of the form  ) ), 1 (( R z z    . The uncompensated taxable 
income elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate,  ) 1 (   , can then be decomposed 
according to the Slutsky relationship 
 
                                                 
4 In fact, this is also most appropriate from a theoretical point of view. The proposition that the taxable income 
elasticity captures all behavioural responses necessary to evaluate the deadweight loss of  income taxation has 
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where 
c   is the compensated taxable income elasticity with respect to  ) 1 (    and  R   is the 
virtual income elasticity.  
Despite the well-known fact that 
c   is the central parameter needed for welfare 
evaluation (see e.g. Feldstein 1999), the previous literature has so far not set out to specify R 
and to estimate R  . A large amount of works (Feldstein 1995, Auten and Carroll 1999 and 
others) implicitly assumes that  0  R  . On the other hand, Gruber and Saez (2002) derives an 
empirical equation that includes an approximation of the term   ) 1 ( / ) (     z zd dR as a way 
to control for the income effect of a tax change. The approximations made by Gruber and 
Saez are, however, only valid for small tax changes and rather poor approximations of larger 
ones. 
In this paper we specify virtual incomes by adopting a standard procedure in the labor 
supply literature. Let ) 1 ( i    and  i R  be the net-of-tax rate and virtual income for an individual 
located on the i:th segment of the tax schedule. The budget constraints have been calculated 
while taking the actual values of the parameters that determine the budget constraint as given. 
These parameters include unearned income (positive or negative), the number of children in 
the household and geographical location.
 5  Here we only consider individuals who are placed 
on locations where the income tax function is differentiable.
6 In contrast to earlier taxable 
income studies on Swedish data (Holmlund and Söderström 2007, Ljunge and Ragan 2005, 
Selén 2004 and Hansson 2007) we have not only taken the statutory income tax schedule into 
account in the tax calculations, but also the marginal effects from means-tested housing 
allowances. Suppose that the budget constraint consists of  N  segments and let  i z  be the 
upper kink point in terms of of the i:th segment. We then define virtual income of the first 
segment,  1 R , as 
 
                                                 
5 See appendix A for a detailed description of the tax and transfer system. 
6 In our estimation sample, 3 men and 2 women were located at kink points in 1981. Since the marginal tax rates 
are not defined for these, we have deleted these few observations in the empirical analysis.   7
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Virtual incomes in upper segments,  ) , 2 ( N i  , can be written as 
 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (         i i i i i z R R    (c.f. Blomquist 1988). Since individuals differ with respect 
to their non-labor income  1 R , individuals that are placed on the same segment of the income 
tax schedule will in general have different virtual incomes.  
 
3.2 Why do hourly wage rates change over time?  
There are at least three reasons why individual hourly wage rates vary over time: (i) because 
an individual’s effort in a broad sense changes, (ii) because a larger or smaller part of the 
compensation is taken in the form of fringe benefits instead of regular cash pay or (iii) 
because of general equilibrium effects when either the supply or demand for labor shifts. 
These shifts in demand and supply curves might be caused by changes in the income tax 
system, pay roll taxes or other factors unrelated to taxes, such as changes in technology or 
shifts in the demand for goods. The focus of our study is not on the general equilibrium 
effects of the taxes, but on how a single individual reacts to changes in the net-of- tax rate and 
in the virtual income. 
The first set of changes can be divided into at least four types of behavioural changes, 
more effort on present job, switching to a better paid job that requires more effort, a 
geographical move to a better paid job and investments in human capital. In the next section 
we lump together these four types of adaption to the tax system and study how an individual 
chooses effort defined in a very broad sense.  
Part of the compensation for work comes in other forms than wages. In Sweden the 
most important such compensation would probably be occupational pensions. In the US 
company paid health insurance would be a major fringe benefit. How large part of total 
compensation that comes in the form of wages is probably influenced by tax laws as well as 
tax rates. Since these laws change over time the division of total payment between fringe 
benefits and wages will probably also vary over time. It also implies that the wage response to 
a change in the marginal tax can differ over time, if the rules governing how fringe benefits 
are taxed have changed. This is essentially the point made in Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002)   8
when discussing the elasticity of taxable income. The parameters estimated in the taxable 
income literature are in general reduced form parameters where the parameters reflect both 
underlying preferences as well as other properties of the tax system than those described by 
the marginal tax rates.
7  
The third set of changes can be of several kinds. In an economy where the wage rate is 
market determined the change in taxes might lead to a shift in the aggregate supply seen as a 
function of the wage rate for a standard unit of work, and a movement along the demand 
curve with a decrease in the market wage if aggregate hours has increased and an increase if 
aggregate hours have decreased. If wages are largely determined by union contracts, the 
“market” wage might still be affected by the change in taxes. Changes in the payroll tax will 
like wise shift the demand curve and the equilibrium wage for a standard unit of work.  
It can be of help for the empirical specification to formally model the influences on the 
wage rate listed above. The market responses to changes in the tax system might be different 
for different wage groups as they belong to different segments of the labor market. The same 
applies for exogenous productivity growth. Here we assume that the wage for an individual i 
in group j at time t is given by  
 
( , ) ( ,technology )
ijt
ijt ijt ijt j t W E A taxsystem e
        (3) 
 
 where E is effort level,   a vector of individual characteristics and   a random term. The 
function  j A  is meant to give the equilibrium wage rate for a standard unit of labor of type j . 
It depends on the intersection of demand and supply curves of labor seen as a function of the 
wage rate for a standard unit of labor. We assume this function varies between groups. 
Taking logs and differencing between time t and t-k we obtain: 
 
  ) ( ) / ln( ) , ( / ) , ( ln ) / ln( k ijt ijt k jt j k ijt ijt ijt ijt k ijt ijt A A E E W W                    (4) 
 
In this paper we are interested in the parameters of ln ( , ) E   . In the next section we give a 
model for the behaviour generating this wage function. One should keep in mind that since 
the wage rate is an important component of taxable income the above remarks are valid also 
for taxable income. 
                                                 
7 See also Blomquist (1988) and Heim and Meyer (2004) for discussions of how parameters in behavioural  
relations sometimes is a mixture of preference parameters and parameters of the budget constraint.    9
 
3.3 Empirical model for hourly wage rates 
Consider a simple extension of the standard neo-classic static labor supply model, where the 
individual also has the option to choose the optimal amount of work effort. Let E denote work 
effort (interpreted broadly so as to accommodate all the types of adaption listed under point 
(i). above). 
  Individuals maximise utility according to the well-behaved utility function 
) , , ( H E C U U  . We assume that  ) , (   E m W  , where m from the individual’s point of 
view is a constant. In what follows, we normalize m to be one. Given that the individual is 
located on a linear segment of the income tax function the budget constraint can be expressed 
as  M H E C     ) , ( ) 1 (    , where   is the marginal tax rate,  C is consumption, H is 
hours of work and M is virtual income. After optimisation we obtain optimal hourly wage rate 
functions of the form        ; , ), 1 ( M E W   . In this paper we will impose the following 
functional form assumption for        ; , ), 1 ( M E  : 
 
i i it it it t M t          5 4 3 2 1 ln ) 1 ln( ln            (5) 
 
where, again, i indexes individuals and t time. As seen above, a time effect is assumed to 
work linearly both independently and through the vector of individual characteristics  , 
which are supposed to be time-invariant.  
Before proceeding we make the observation that the virtual income term  it M  is 
unobservable in the context of a model where the individual chooses both work effort and 
hours of work. However, for a given amount of effort the budget constraint is observable in 
the  ) , ( H C -plane. Here, we will approximate  it M  from the  ) , ( H C -plane while treating the 
effort level as fixed. The computation of the virtual income term  it M  for this model will 
therefore coincide with the computation of R for the taxable income supply model described 
in section 2.1. Taking first differences of (5) between time t  and t-k  we obtain 
 
 i k it it k it it k it it k M M k          4 3 2 1 ) / ln( ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ln ) / ln(           (6) 
 
Combining (6) with the terms in equation (4) that are outside the control of the individual we 
obtain:  
   10
12 3 4
ln( / )
ln (1 ) / (1 ) ln( / ) ln( / ) ( ) (7)
ijt ijt k
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The  ij  -vector might contain both observed and unobserved characteristics. To account for 
observable characteristics that interact with the time trend we include quadratics in years of 
schooling, years of work experience, age and the number of children. In similarity with e.g. 
Auten and Carroll (1999), Sillamaa and Veall (2001), Aarbu and Thoresen (2001), Hansson 
(2007) and others, we let the set of individual characteristics be measured in the base period.  
We also need to control for time-invariant individual unobserved factors (like innate 
ability) that interact with the time trend as well as aggregate factors. The former are captured 
by the  ) / ln( k jt j A A  term in (7). In principle, if we were able to find a good proxy variable for 
the unobserved heterogeneity at the individual level this would account for wage growth 
factors both at the individual level and at the group level. 
Wooldridge (2002, p.63-67) suggests that the dependent variable from an earlier period 
can be used as a proxy for unobserved heterogeneity. Basically, we adopt this procedure here. 
Since we do not have access to lagged hourly wage rates for a sufficient number of 
observations in our sample we use the log of lagged taxable labor income as a proxy variable 
in the hourly wage rate regressions. To lessen the influence from transitory shocks in income, 
we use the log of a three year average of taxable labor income in 1975, 1976 and 1977. 
8 To 
avoid any correlation between  ) ( k ijt ijt    and the proxy variable we utilize income variables 
from 4-6 years before the base year 1981.  
In addition, we allow for the possibility that the unobserved heterogeneity affects wage 
growth differently depending on which segment of the labor market the individual belongs to. 
We divide the entire sample (men and women pooled) into 10 groups and let the the j:th group 
of the labor market be defined by the j:th decile, where deciles are based on the income 
measure that is constructed from the 1975-77 income variables. Along these lines, to some of 
the regressions we add a 10-piece spline function in our logged averaged lagged income 
variable. The knots of the spline are defined by the deciles.
9 As we use observations from 
1981 and 1991 our estimating equation then becomes  
 
                                                 
8 The variable is constructed in the following way:    
77
75 ln ln / k k TLI TLI v
    where TLI is taxable labor 
income and v is the number of years for which  0 TLI  . 
9 A 10-piece spline in income has earlier been added to the right-hand side of regression equations in e.g. Gruber 
and Saez (2002) and Kopczuk (2005). Our motivation is somewhat different though.   11
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where  1981 ij X  is a vector of control variables and  ) (ln ij TLI f  is a function of the log of 
average lagged taxable labor income. We will also run similar regressions with the change in 
the log of taxable labor income,    1981 1991 / ln ij ij TLI TLI , as the dependent variable. The log-log 
specification has earlier been used by a majority of authors in the taxable income literature, 
e.g. Auten and Carroll (1999), Gruber and Saez (2002) and Kopzcuk (2005).  
 
3.4. Endogenous regressors 
The most apparent methodological challenge involved in estimating (8) is that the location of 
the individual on the income tax schedule is a function of the dependent variable. Thus, 
movements in the contemporaneous error term do not only affect the wage rate or taxable 
labor income variable, but the net-of-tax rate and virtual income regressors as well. What are 
then needed are valid instruments for    ) 1 /( ) 1 ( ln k it it       and    k it it M M  / ln .  
Previous literature analyzing taxable income responsiveness with panel data has almost 
exclusively, in some way or another, used instruments that are functions of first period 
income. It has become a common practice (Auten and Carroll 1999, Gruber and Saez , 
Kopczuk 2005 and others) to construct instruments by computing ‘synthetic marginal tax 
rates’ based on taxable income in the first period.
10 Let  it z  refer to taxable income,  it   to the 
marginal tax rate and  p to an index that is either a wage, income or a consumer price index. 
Then the standard instrument for        ) ( 1 / ) ( 1 ln k it k it it it z z        is 
   ) ( 1 / ) ( 1 ln k it k it k it it z pz        , where  ) ( k it it pz    is the marginal tax rate as a function of 
the tax law of period t and the taxable income in the base period,   k it z  . It has been alleged 
that the change in the log of the synthetic marginal tax rates, 
   ) ( 1 / ) ( 1 ln k it k it k it it z pz        , only should reflect pure exogenous tax law changes and 
exclude behavioral ones. 
                                                 
10 Other strategies to instrumenting that rely on first period income are e.g. Feldstein (1995) who groups 
taxpayers by their pre-reform marginal tax rates in difference-in-difference estimations, an approach that has 
been extended to a regression framework by Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000). The sole exception that we know of is 
Carroll (1998) who obtains a tax instrument by using an average of taxable income between the two years of 
investigation.   12
However, as highlighted by Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000), it is in general unlikely that 
k it z    is correlated to the same degree with   it   as with  k it  . Consequently,  k it z   is probably 
correlated with  k it it    .  In the literature, this problem is frequently dealt with by including 
some function of  k it z   into the regression equation as a proxy for the transitory element 
in k it   as well as trends in the income distribution.
11 However, we have not seen any proof 
that this procedure actually solves the endogeneity problem.  
In this study we propose a new kind of instrument for the change in the log net-of-tax 
rate that is not a function of base year income. Our instrument will be of the form 
    ) ˆ ( 1 / ) ˆ ( 1 ln k it k it it it z z         where  it z ˆ  denotes imputed taxable labor income for period t. 
As explained above, in our study we use a 10-year difference, more specifically we set 
1991  t  and  1981   k t . To obtain  it z ˆ  we have regressed both  1991 i z  and  1981 i z  on a fourth 
order polynomial in  1986 i z , a set of controls for individual characteristics based on their 1981 
values and a full set of interaction variables between  1986 i z  and the socio-demographic control 
variables.
12 The vector of individual characteristics is identical to the one included in the main 
regression equation and is based on the values of these variables as measured as of 1981.  
The key feature of our instrument is that it is a function of taxable labor income in 
1986, i.e. the year in the middle of the year difference. The presumption is that 1986 i   is 
uncorrelated with  1981 1991 i i    . The intuitive appeal of the instrument is that, even in the 
presence of substantial first-order auto-correlation in  it  , a transitory shock in  1981 i   ( 1986 i  )  
has a negligible impact on  1986 i   ( 1991 i  ).   
Since the virtual income also depends on the location at the income tax schedule 
 k it it M M  / ln  is instrumented in the same vein.  
4. Data  
The data come from the 1981 and 1991 waves of the Swedish Level of Living Survey, 
designed to be representative of the Swedish population. The questionnaires for these two 
years resemble each other to a high degree. We have also had access to register data on the 
                                                 
11 Kopczuk (2005), who stacks many year-differences and construct instruments based on base year income 
constructs separate controls for the trend in the income distribution and the transitory component of the error 
term. He both controls for functions of log income for the year before the base year and the difference between 
base year income and the income for the year preceding the base year. 
12 Men and women have been pooled in these two auxiliary regressions. The adjusted 
2 R -values are around 
0.96 in the separate regressions for  1981 i z  and  1991 i z .   13
individuals (and their spouses) participating in the survey, provided by the tax registers of 
Statistics Sweden. The survey variables are exclusively available for the years when the 
Swedish Level of Living survey was conducted, whereas the register data also are available 
for surrounding years. The survey and register variables have been utilised in the calculation 
of budget constraints. During the time period of study the individual, and not the household, 
was the taxable unit with respect to taxation of labor incomes.
13  
We restrict the sample to those who were married or cohabiting both in 1981 and 1991. 
This is because spousal income is a central part of the virtual income measure. In addition, we 
only include individuals of working age. Since no married individuals in the data were 
younger than 22 in 1981 our data set consists of individuals who were aged 22-54 in 1981 
(and 32-64 in 1991). We exclude those who were self-employed either in 1981 or 1991 or in 
both years since hourly wage rates are obtained for employees only. Exclusions have also 
been made due to missing values for some of the variables included in the regressions and the 
variables needed to calculate the housing allowance. Our final sample consists of 586 males 
and 522 females.
14  
The hourly wage rate variable, which is the dependent variable in many of the 
regressions, is measured by a number of survey questions, where respondents are asked to 
report different kinds of wage income. The wage rate variable is highly comparable between 
the two years. If respondents are not paid on an hourly basis, the hourly wage rate is obtained 
as a ratio between weekly or monthly pay and reported normal hours of work. Thus, our wage 
rate measure has not been obtained by dividing a taxable earnings measure with reported 
hours of work, which is the case in many other data sets. Hence, given that the measurement 
errors in the wage rate are distributed with zero mean, which is a very reasonable assumption, 
measurement errors do affect the efficiency, but not the consistency, of our estimates.  
The taxable labor income variable, which is our second dependent variable, is taken 
from the tax registers.  It is defined as the earnings net of costs of earning the income. These 
costs are mainly the tax deductible part of work related travel costs.
 Hence, our taxable labor 
income concept does not embrace the Swedish counterpart to ‘itemized deductions’ in the 
                                                 
13 Joint taxation of capital income was abolished in 1986. However, wealth was taxed on a joint family basis 
during the whole time period of study. 
14 Since our estimation procedure requires individuals to fulfil the inclusion criteria both in 1981 and 1991 the 
sample size is a bit smaller than what is common for labor supply studies conducted on this data source. E.g. 
Blomquist et. al. (2001) include 864 prime aged married men from the 1981 wave of the survey and 680 married 
men from the 1991 wave.    14
U.S. In essential respects, the definition of the taxable labor income concept is similar 
between the two years. 
15 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict the 1981 and 1991 levels of log real wages and log taxable 
labor income respectively by income decile. Visual inspection of the first graph suggests that 
the overall growth in real wages was quite low between the two years. The percentage growth 
is, however, somewhat higher in the uppermost deciles. The tendency of slightly higher wage 
dispersion during the 1980’s has earlier been documented by Edin and Holmlund (1995). 
Figure 4 shows that taxable labor income has increased quite evenly across the sample as 
well, even though the increase is somewhat smaller in the middle deciles. One should 
remember that the individuals participating in the sample were 10 years older in 1991 than in 
1981.  
The main lesson from Figure 3 and Figure 4 is though that the evolution of the Swedish 
wage and income distribution during the 1980’s was very different from its U.S. counterpart. 














Figure 3. Average log real hourly wage rates in 1981 and 1991 by income decile based on taxable labor income 
in 1986. Hourly wage rates in 1981 have been inflated to the 1991 price level by the consumer price index. Men 
and women are pooled. 
 
                                                 
15 See e.g. Slemrod (1998) and  Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) for discussions  of the importance to use a constant 
tax base between the two years. In Sweden, the wider taxable income concepts changed dramatically in 1991 as 
dual income taxation (i.e. separate taxation of capital and labor income) was introduced.  
16 See Freeman and Katz (1995) for a comparison between countries. Goolsbee (2000) has argued for that trends 
in income equality pose a serious methodological problem for estimating taxable income elasticities on U.S. 












Figure 4. Average log real taxable labor income in 1981 and 1991 by income decile based on taxable labor 
income in 1986. Taxable labor incomes in 1981 have been inflated to the 1991 price level by the consumer price 
index. Men and women are pooled. 
 
 
5. Estimation results 
In this section we present the estimation results. Since we have found that the structure differs 
between men and women we report results for each gender separately. Throughout the 2SLS 
estimations, the first stage F-statistics of the excluded instruments are always high and not 
reported. Thus, the instruments are strongly correlated with the instrumented regressors. 
Regression results for log hourly wage rates are reported in Table 1, whereas the results 
for log taxable labor income are described in Table 2. These tables share a common structure. 
The first four columns of each table display the results for married males; the last four 
columns display the results for married females. In the first column we have included a set of 
socio-demographic control variables, but no income controls. In the second column we have 
controlled linearly for the log of average lagged taxable labor income. The third column 
shows the results when instead a 10-piece spline in log average lagged taxable labor income is 
added to the regression. The fourth column, finally, reflects the situation when the coefficient 
for the virtual income term is constrained to be zero. To ease exposition, we only report the 
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5.1 Hourly wage rates 
Columns (1)-(4) of Table 1 convey an interesting message: male log hourly wage rates exhibit 
a sharp response to log net-of-tax rates. The elasticity estimate is 0.14 when income controls 
are disregarded (column 1). When income controls are included the net-of-tax rate elasticity 
slightly increases. When the 10-piece linear spline function is added (column 3) the elasticity 
estimate is 0.16. It is worth emphasizing that all these elasticity estimates are precisely 
estimated. Throughout column (1)-(3) they are significant at a level of 1 %.  
  Viewed from the perspective that wage rates have been taken as given in the standard 
static neo-classical labor supply model our elasticity estimates must be considered as large.
17 
However, we do not find any evidence for that the log virtual income would affect the log 
hourly wage. The non-labor income elasticity estimates are always very close to zero and 
insignificant. In column (4), where we constrain the coefficient for the virtual income term to 
be zero, the net-of-tax rate elasticity estimate decreases a little bit and becomes significant at a 
level of 5%. 
Columns (5)-(8) of Table 1 show the corresponding estimates for married females. 
Interestingly, the wage rate elasticities are considerably higher for women than for men. In 
column (6)-(8) the elasticity estimates are significant at a level of 5%. It is noteworthy that the 
inclusion of income controls has a greater impact on the results for women than for men. In 
particular, the elasticity estimate appears to be downward biased when flexible income 
controls are absent. Without income controls the net-of-tax rate elasticity amounts to 0.39, but 
when the 10-piece spline function is added the net-of-tax rate elasticity increases to 0.5. In 
similarity to males, the non-labor income elasticities are always close to zero for females. 
Given that the responsiveness in wage rates encompasses other dimensions of work effort 
than hours worked, the larger female elasticities is in line with the stylized fact that female 
labor supply is more responsive to tax changes than male labor supply. As for men, non-labor 
income elasticities are estimated to be small and not significantly different from zero. 
                                                 
17 From a completely different point of departure Holmlund and Kolm (1995) have regressed changes in logged 
hourly wage rates, obtained by dividing earnings with a survey variable of number of hours worked for full time 
workers, on changes in a logged measure of tax progressivity and average tax rates. Their model framework, 
where a trade union and a firm bargain over wages and unemployment, predicts that tax progressivity should 
lead to wage moderation. Their regression results show that the coefficients for the tax progressivity measure, 
where the marginal tax rate of course is an essential element, generally are significant and with expected sign. As 
actually noted by Holmlund and Kolm (1995), this is also consistent with the interpretation that individuals 
might change their work effort in response to changes in tax progressivity.   17
Table 1. 2SLS Regression Results for Log Hourly Wage Rates. 
  Males  Females 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
            
Net-of-tax rate  0.143  0.150  0.157 0.153 0.412 0.451 0.569 0.569 
elasticity  (0.053)*** (0.055)*** (0.060)***  (0.063)**  (0.214)*  (0.222)**  (0.282)**  (0.281)** 
            
            
Non-labor income   0.004 0.007 0.007    -0.003 -0.001 -0.003   
elasticity  (0.025) (0.025) (0.026)    (0.028)  (0.028)  (0.030)   
               
             
Average lagged     -0.041       -0.067    
taxable labor income    (0.025)*       (0.029)**    
             
10-piece spline in  No  No Yes Yes  No  No Yes Yes 
average lagged income              
             
Observations  586  586  586 586 522 522 522 522 
            
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. All regressions include 
control variables for years of schooling in 1981, squared years of schooling, years of work experience in 1981, squared years of work 
experience, squared age in 1981, number of children in the household in 1981, squared number of children in the household and a constant.
    18
Table 2. 2SLS Regression Results for Log Taxable Labor Income. 
  Males  Females 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Uncompensated   0.207 0.205 0.210 0.250 0.964 1.049 1.442 1.443 
net-of-tax rate elasticity   (0.068)*** (0.064)*** (0.074)*** (0.080)***  (0.570)*  (0.598)*  (0.832)*  (0.831)* 
          
          
Non-labor income   -0.067 -0.068 -0.069    -0.041 -0.038 -0.042   
elasticity  (0.035)*  (0.035)*  (0.036)*    (0.060) (0.061) (0.069)   
          
          
Implied  compensated    0.252 0.251 0.257 0.250  0.982 1.065 1.460 1.443 
net-of-tax rate elasticity  (0.072)*** (0.070)*** (0.080)*** (0.080)***  (0.582)* (0.609)* (0.845)* (0.831)* 
          
          
Average lagged     0.009       -0.144    
taxable labor income    (0.109)       (0.052)***    
           
10-piece spline in  No  No Yes Yes No  No Yes Yes 
average lagged income            
           
Observations  586 586 586 586 522 522 522 522 
          
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10%, ** significance at 5% and *** significance at 1%. All regressions include 
control variables for years of schooling in 1981, squared years of schooling, years of work experience in 1981, squared years of work experience, 
squared age in 1981, number of children in the household in 1981, squared number of children in the household and a constant.  Standard errors 
and confidence intervals for the implied compensated net-of-tax rate elasticities have been obtained by the delta method.     19
5.2 Taxable labor income 
Table 2 reports the regression results when log taxable labor income is the dependent 
variable. For taxable labor income we in addition to the uncompensated elasticities also report 
the implied compensated elasticities. The latter have been obtained from the Slutsky-
decomposition described in equation (1) in section 3.1. The estimated uncompensated taxable 
labor income elasticity for males is always significantly different from zero at a level of 1 
percent. It is noteworthy that the (uncompensated) net-of-tax rate elasticity estimates for 
males are insensitive to the inclusion of income controls. Throughout columns (1)-(3) the net-
of-tax rate elasticity estimates can be rounded to 0.21.  
However, the most remarkable feature of column (1)-(3) of Table 2 is that the non-labor 
income elasticites are statistically significant at a level of 10 %. Moreover, they take on 
expected sign. When income controls are added the non-labor income elasticity is estimated 
to be around -0.07 (column 2-3). Remember that this is the first study in the taxable income 
literature that specifies virtual incomes. The main bulk of the previous literature has implicitly 
constrained the non-labor income elasticity to be 0. Column (4) reports the uncompensated 
net-of-tax rate elasticity when this restriction is imposed. The uncompensated net-of-tax rate 
elasticity is now estimated to 0.25, i.e. 4 percentage points higher as compared to column (3). 
This suggests that the net-of-tax rate coefficient potentially picks up variation that should be 
ascribed to the virtual income term. 
Since we did not find any significant income effects when estimating hourly wage rates 
a plausible interpretation is that the income effect works through the labor supply choice in 
terms of hours worked. 
The estimates for males are comparable with those previously obtained on Swedish data 
by Hansson (2007). She estimates a net-of-tax rate elasticity of 0.29 for males. While using a 
family model, where spouses consider each other’s net-of-tax rates, Gelber (2008), also on 
Swedish data, estimates own net-of-tax rate elasticities to be 0.17 for males, which is by and 
large of the same magnitude as our estimates for married males.  
An implication of our results is that the compensated taxable labor income elasticity is 
estimated to be larger than the uncompensated one. If we apply the simple formula in (1) and 
evaluate the term    R z / ) 1 (    at the male sample mean values of  ) 1 (   ,  z  and R  we 
obtain a compensated taxable labor income elasticity, 
c  , of a magnitude of 0.25-0.26. 
18  
                                                 
18 For males we have that      6783 . 0 262 , 146 / 006 , 209 * 4747 . 0 / ) 1 (    R z  . The mean values have been 
obtained by pooling the 1981 and 1991 male observations in the sample. Nominal values for z and R and have   20
In some sense, it is good news for the previous literature that we obtain approximately 
the same compensated elasticities when we constrain the virtual income term to be zero. For 
welfare evaluation, the compensated elasticity is the relevant measure (Feldstein 1999). Still, 
in some applications we want to know what actually happens with the income supply and tax 
revenues if we alter certain tax parameters. Then the uncompensated elasticity is the relevant 
elasticity and this might be incorrectly estimated if the virtual income term is omitted. 
For females the taxable labor income elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate is 
estimated to be considerably larger than for males. The elasticity estimates hover between 
0.96 and 1.44. In similarity with Table 1 the estimates for females are less precise than 
corresponding estimates for males. Still, they are all significant at a level of 10 percent. 
Larger standard errors for females were expected for two reasons. First, since women on 
average are to be found in lower tax brackets the variation in the change in log net-of-tax rates 
is smaller for them.
19 Second, the size of the female sample is smaller.  
For females the non-labor income elasticity estimates are of expected sign and around    
-0.045. However, these estimates are far from being significantly distinct from zero. The 
compensated elasticities, evaluated at the female sample mean values of  ) 1 (   ,  z  and R , are 
approximately 2 percentage points larger than the uncompensated ones.  
Labor supply studies previously conducted on the same data set, the Swedish Level of 
Living Survey, have obtained hours of work elasticities with respect to the net wage rate of a 
magnitude of 0.08-0.1 (e.g. Blomquist and Newey 2002, Blomquist et. al. 2001) for men and 
0.3-0.75 for women (Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz 1990, Liang 2008). It is worth noting 
that the earlier obtained male and female labor supply elasticities and the hourly wage rate 
elasticities reported in Table 1 by and large add up to the taxable labor income elasticities 
shown in Table 2 both for males and females. 
 
6. Concluding discussion 
 
Using Swedish panel data from 1981 and 1991, spanning a time period with large changes in 
the Swedish tax system, we study how hourly wage rates as well as taxable labor income react 
to changes in marginal tax rates and non-labor income. In particular, we would like to 
emphasize three contributions to the literature on the elasticity of taxable income.  
                                                                                                                                                          
been inflated to the 1991 price level by the consumer price index. For females the corresponding value is 
    4344 . 0 434 , 171 / 863 , 124 * 5964 . 0 / ) 1 (    R z  . 
19 See appendix B for descriptive statistics.    21
First, previous literature has almost exclusively used instruments for the change in net-
of-tax rates that are functions of first period income. In general this will create instruments 
that are invalid. To “solve” this endogeneity problem it is common practice to include some 
function of first period income as a regressor in the estimated function. However, we have not 
come across any reasonable explanation why this should solve the problem. Our data permit 
us to use a different strategy. We use exogenous individual characteristics as well as income 
from 1986, the year in the middle of the time period considered, to construct our instruments. 
The intuitive appeal of this way to construct instruments is that, even in the presence of 
substantial first-order auto-correlation in the transitory shocks, the shock in 1986 would show 
a very weak correlation with either the shock in 1981 or 1991.  
Second, a large part of the literature on the elasticity of taxable income has neglected 
the effect of non-labor income. This implies that one has not been able to estimate the 
compensated effect of the net-of-tax rate, even though it is well known that it is the 
compensated effect that is central to calculations of welfare losses. We use a method to 
calculate “virtual” non-labor income that is common practice in the labor supply literature, 
but which has not previously been adopted in the taxable income literature. For men we find a 
significant income effect when we estimate the taxable labor income elasticity; in our 
preferred specification the elasticity of taxable labor income with respect to non-labor income 
is -0.07.  The compensated and uncompensated elasticities with respect to net-of tax rates are 
0.21 and 0.25 respectively. For women the non-labor income effect is not significant. The 
compensated and uncompensated elasticities with respect to net-of tax rates are 1.44 and 1.46 
respectively.  
Third, as highlighted by Slemrod and Kopczuk (2002) and Kopczuk (2005) the 
elasticity of taxable income is a reduced form parameter and to some extent under 
government control. An implication of this is that it would be of value to know the anatomy 
of the behavioral response. A similar point is emphasized in the concluding section of Saez 
(2003). In this study, we have taken a step forward in this direction by focusing directly on 
how hourly wage rates respond to changes in marginal tax rates. Of course, a caveat is that we 
cannot discriminate between effort responses and shifts in the form of compensation from 
leniently taxed fringe benefits to fully taxed cash pay.  
The effect of changes in non-labor income on changes in the wage rate is not 
significant. However, we have found a marked response in hourly wage rates to changes in 
the net-of-tax rate: the elasticity estimates are in the range 0.14-0.16 for males and 0.41-0.57 
for females. These results suggest that wage responsiveness to tax changes is just as important   22
as hours of work responses, or perhaps even more important. Furthermore, as explained 
above, the hourly wage rate elasticities obtained here are consistent with our own estimated 
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Appendix A. The Swedish tax and transfer system in 1981 and 1991 
 
 
A.1 The statutory income tax schedule 
A global income tax system was in place in Sweden in 1981, i.e. earned income and unearned 
income (capital income) were taxed according to the same income tax schedule, a schedule 
that is illustrated in Table A.1. The statutory ‘federal’ tax schedule was in general highly 
progressive and contained 22 brackets. However, a special tax reduction caused the marginal 
tax rate to actually decrease over some intervals. There were also two caps for the marginal 
tax rate. Below SEK192,000 SEK the marginal tax rate (‘federal’ marginal tax rate + local tax 
rate) was not allowed to exceed 0.8.
20 And above 192,000 the maximum limit was 0.85.  
 
Table A.1. Statutory Income Tax Schedule in 1981 
Assessed income  Marginal tax rate  Assessed income  Marginal tax rate 
0-6,400 0  64,000-70,400  0.5455 
6,400-25,600 0.3155  70,400-76,600  0.5855 
25,600-32,000 0.3355 76,600-76,800 0.5555 
32,000-38,400 0.3455 76,800-83,200 0.5855 
38,400-40,000 0.3755 83,200-89,600 0.6255 
40,000-44,800 0.2755 89,600-96,000 0.6755 
44,800-44,900 0.3055  96,000-102,400  0.7355 
44,900-51,200 0.4055  102,400-108,800  0.7455 
51,200-57,600 0.4355  108,800-128,000  0.7755 
57,600-60,000 0.4955  128,000-192,000  0.8 
60,000-64,000 0.5155 above  192,000  0.85 
Marginal tax rates are reported for an individual with an average  
local tax rate (=0.2955) 
 
The global income tax system was abandoned in 1991. In the new dual income tax system 
capital income was taxed at a proportional rate of 0.3, whereas earned income was still taxed 
according to a progressive income tax schedule. If a deficit in capital income would emerge, 
the taxpayer could deduct a fraction of the deficit from the tax on earned income.
21 The 
number of brackets was seven in 1991 - a considerably lower amount of segments than in 
                                                 
20 Throughout this appendix we use the nominal values for both years. The 1981 income values can be deflated 
to the 1991 price level by a factor   1 272.2/112.  by the consumer price index. 
21 The tax reduction amounted to 30 percent of the deficit given that the deficit was lower than 100,000 SEK. 
Above that limit only 21 percent of the deficit could be deducted. The tax reduction was, however, not allowed 
to exceed the tax payment on earned income.   26
1981. As can be viewed in Table A.2, in the highest income tax bracket the marginal tax rate 
was 0.5112 for an individual with an average local tax rate. The regressive elements of the tax 
schedule were due to the phase-out region of the standard deduction. For assessed earnings 
below SEK 63,892 and above SEK 184,803 the standard deduction amounted to SEK 
10,304.
22 In the interval 63,892 SEK to 101,888 SEK the standard deduction increased at a 
rate of 0.25. However, between 101,888 and 184,803 it decreased at a rate of 0.1.  
 
Table A.2. Statutory Income Tax Schedule in 1991 







above 184,803  0.5155 
Marginal tax rates are reported for an individual with an average local tax rate (=0.3155) 
 
A.2 Housing allowance 
An important feature of the system for housing allowances in Sweden was that the allowance 
was dependent on household income, which created an additional marginal effect for the 
individual. In both 1981 and 1991, the allowance entailed two components. First, the maximal 
amount of housing allowance was calculated as a function of the qualifying housing costs and 
family composition.
23 Second, the maximal allowance was reduced according to a set of 
reduction rates that were determined by qualifying income and household composition. The 
reduction rates and marginal tax rates for given income levels were then merged to a common 
vector when calculating the budget constraints.  
 
The annual maximal housing allowance in 1981 can be written as 
 
0.8 * SEK) 500 SEK cost housing g (qualifyin SEK 1,860 * children of number MH81     
 
                                                 
22 There was also a standard deduction, which was 4,000 SEK for taxpayers earning more than 40,000 SEK. 
23 In 1991 special rules applied to individuals aged below 29. Since our sample consists of individuals between 
19 and 54 years of age in 1981, these rules do not affect any observations in our study. Therefore, we do not 
report them here.   27
The qualifying housing costs were not allowed to exceed certain levels, where the maximum 
levels were determined by household composition.
24 The housing cost limits for 1981 are 
reported in Table A.3 below. 
 
Table A.3. Limits for Qualifying Housing Costs in 1981 
Number of children  Housing cost limit 
0  750 (S), 850(M) 
1-2  1,250 
3-4  1,500 
more than 4  1,800 
(S) denotes singles and (M) married. 
 
In the 1991 system the corresponding maximal housing allowance, for households with 
children, can be written 
 
SEK cost housing qualifying SEK 1,000 MH91    
 
Furthermore, the qualifying housing cost is determined by the number of children. Table A.4 
reports the lower, middle and upper limits for qualifying housing costs in 1991. The transfer 
covers 75 percent of the costs between the lower and middle limit and 50 percent of the cost 
between the middle and upper limit. For two-person or single households without children the 









                                                 
24 For rented (and co-opereative) apartments the housing authorities use the reported rent as a basis of housing 
cost. For owner-occupied homes interest payments, tax on real estate and regional location, size of housing and 
type of housing are used when computing the housing costs. For 1981 we use a survey-based total measure of 
housing costs, whereas we for 1991 instead are able to utilise survey variables for housing type and size and 
register variables on interest deductions and real estate tax in order to calculate housing costs according to the 
template that the housing authorities employ.    28
Table A.4. Limits for Qualifying Housing Costs in 1991 
Number of children  Lower  Middle  Upper 
1 1,800  2,400  3,500 
2 1,500  2,800  4,000 
more than 2  1,200  3,200  4,500 
 
 
In both 1981 and 1991 the qualifying income, which determines the reduction rate, is based 
on total income of the household and wealth exceeding a certain amount.
25 If the present year 
household income was in the neighbourhood of the household income two years earlier, the 
allowance was based on the latter. In this interval, there was no additional marginal effect 
from the housing allowance system. But for larger changes, the amount of the transfer was 
dependent on the income acquisition in the present year. The maximal allowance was reduced 
according to Table A.5 for 1981 and Table A.6 for 1991. At some point the entire allowance 
was taxed away. After that point the marginal effect from housing allowances was zero. 
 
 
Table A.5. Rate of Reductions in Housing Allowance for Households in 1981 
Aggregated total income 1981  Rate of reduction 
1   If 79 a Y     
          ) 000 , 20 1 ( 0   a   0 
         ) 000 , 20 2 ( ) 000 , 20 1 (    a a   0.15 
           ) 000 , 20 2 (a   0.24 
2 1   If 79 a Y a      
          ) 000 , 5 1 ( 0   a   0 
           ) 000 , 5 ( ) 000 , 5 1 ( 79    Y a   0.15 
           ) 000 , 20 ( ) 000 , 5 ( 79 79    Y Y   0 
           ) 000 , 20 2 ( ) 000 , 20 ( 79    a Y   0.15 
             ) 000 , 20 2 (a   0.24 
2   If 79 a Y     
          ) 000 , 5 1 ( 0   a   0 
                                                 
25 In 1981, 20 percent of wealth exceeding 75,000 SEK was added to the qualifying income. In 1991, 20 percent 
of wealth exceeding 180,000 SEK for spouses and 90,000 for singles was included.  Net loss of source of income 
exceeding 4,000 SEK was also taken into account in the 1981 qualifying income measure.    29
          ) 000 , 5 2 ( ) 000 , 5 1 (    a a   0.15 
          ) 000 , 5 ( ) 000 , 5 2 ( 79    Y a   0.24 
          ) 000 , 20 ( ) 000 , 5 ( 79 79    Y Y   0 
           ) 000 , 20 ( 79 Y   0.24 
79 Y is aggregated total income in 1979.  1 a  equals 29,000 SEK for single and two-person households without 
children, 38,000 SEK for spouses with children and 30,000 for singles with at least one child.  2 a  is equal to 
59,000 for all. 
 
Table A.6. Rate of Reductions in Housing Allowance for Households in 1991 
Aggregated total income 1991  Rate of reduction 
a Y  89   If    
) 000 , 50 ( 0   a   0 
  ) 000 , 50 (a   B 
a Y  89   If    
) 000 , 15 ( 0   a   0 
) 000 , 15 ( ) 000 , 15 ( 89    Y a   B 
) 000 , 50 ( ) 000 , 15 ( 89 89    Y Y   0 
  ) 000 , 50 ( 89 Y   B 
89 Y  is aggregated total income in 1989. a  is 81,000 SEK for households with children and 66,000 SEK for 
households without children. b is 0.2 for households with children and 0.1 for households without children. 
 
A.3 Taxation of housing 
In 1981, an implicit income from owner-occupied housing was taxed together with other 
sources of income according to the income tax schedule in figure A.1.
26 In 1991, owner 
occupied homes were separately taxed at a rate of 0.012 of the assessed value of the house. 
Both in 1981 and 1991, the assessed value was an undervaluation of the market value. When 
computing the imputed income from owner-occupied housing, which equals the market value 
multiplied with the nominal interest rate, we have therefore corrected for this by using so-
called purchase-price coefficients. It has been possible to derive the assessed value from 




                                                 
26 The implicit income from owner-occupied housing was determined by the ratable value of the house in a 
progressive manner in 1981.    30
A.4 Child allowance 
Households with children received a fixed amount, 3,000 SEK, per year and child in 1981. 
The 1991 child allowance system implied a basic transfer of 9,000 SEK per year and child. 






























                                                 
27 For 3 children the additonal transfer was 4,500 SEK, for 4 children 13,500 SEK, for 5 children 18,000 SEK, 
for 6 children 40,500 SEK and 7 children 54,000 SEK.   31
Appendix B. Descriptive statistics. 
 
 
Table B1. Descriptive statistics for the estimation sample 
 Men  Women 
Change in log hourly wage rate  0.105  0.068 
 (0.249)  (0.269) 
Change in log taxable labor income  0.160   0.254 
 (0.287)  (0.475) 
Change in net-of-tax rate  0.392  0.213 
 (0.392)  (0.248) 
Change in net-of-tax rate - instrument  0.366  0.181 
 (0.315)  (0.194) 
Change in virtual income  0.823  0.844 
 (0.483  )  (0.513) 
Change in virtual income - instrument  0.823    0.862 
 (0.483  )  (0.495) 
Log average lagged taxable labor income  10.917     10.234 
 (0.506)  (0.664) 
Years of schooling in  1981  11.346      10.705 
 (3.746)  (2.970) 
Squared years of schooling in 1981  142.749      123.402 
 (97.394)  (68.859) 
Years of work experience in 1981  18.710    18.621 
 (9.187)  (9.387) 
Squared years of work experience in 1981  434.314      434.671 
 (367.4389  )  (378.493) 
Squared age in 1981  1507.783      1460.188 
 (598.714  )  (626.900) 
Number of children in 1981  1.510     1.406 
 (1.025)  (0.983) 
Squared number of children in 1981  3.329      2.943 
 (3.429  )  (3.528) 
    
Number of observations  586  522 
Following Blomquist (1979) years of work experience has been defined as  “AGE-8-years of 
schooling”. Standard deviations in paranthesis. 
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